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WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?:
RULE INTERPLEADER, THE ANTIINJUNCTION ACT, IN PERSONAIM
JURISDICTION, AND M.C. ESCHER

Plate 'Waterfall" O 1995 M.C. EscherICordon Art-Baarn-Holland.
reserved. Reprinted by permission.

All rights

At first glance, the picture above may seem unremarkable;
the eye is apt to brush over the image uncritically, taking in the
whole without focusing on the details. On closer examination,
* Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Yale
University; J.D.,
Columbia University.
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one notices that the structure is physically impossible, pleasing
to the eye but not of the real world-unless, of course, there is
some undiscovered place where water spontaneously recycles
itself from the bottom of a waterfall to the top. Much the same
problem afflicts one aspect of federal interpleader. Viewed
quickly enough, it seems to make sense and to represent coherent
policy. Closer examination reveals that the structure is every bit
a s impossible a s any that Escher himself could have created.'
Interpleader is a procedural device designed to settle
conflicting claims to property usually (though not always) held by
a non-claimant without exposing the possessor to multiple or
inconsistent judgmenh2 It has existed since the 1300s.~ For
interpleader to be effective, claimants must not be able to seek
possession of the stake except in the interpleader proceeding;
were they able to do so, the interpleader court might enter a
judgment only to discover that the stake had already been
delivered to one claimant pursuant to another p r ~ c e e d i n g . ~
Accordingly, the interpleader court must to be able to enjoin
either the claimants or other courts from pursuing litigation
inconsistent with the interpleader action.
The foregoing is unremarkable, but when the interpleader
court is federal, the Anti-Injunction Act6creates special problems
because of the federalism issues inherent in any federal court

a

1. I am not the only person to find the law surrounding federal interpleader to
be a bit strange. Professor Zechariah Chafee,Jr., properly regarded as the father of
modern federal interpleader, compared it to the Looking Glass House i n Barrie's
classic. See Zechariah Chafee,Jr., Interpleader irz the United States Courts (pt.I),41
YALEL.J. 1134,1134 (1932)[hereinafter Chafee, United States Courts (pt. I)].
2. The property is known as the stake; the beleaguered possessor is known as
the stakeholder.
3. Werner Ilsen & William Sardell, Interpleader i n the Federal Courts, 35 ST.
JOHN'SL. REV. 1,2 (1960). That the device existed, however, does not tell the whole
story. Common-law interpleader apparently existed primarily to determine
conflicting claims of detinue. Equitable interpleader developed in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Two scholars, after exhaustive study, declared common-law
interpleader "doctrinally irrelevant to modern interpleader." GeoffreyC. Hazard, Jr.,
& Myron Moskovitz, A n Historical and Critical Analysis of Interpleader, 52 CAL.L.
REV. 706,709 (1964).
4. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Ii~terstateInterpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685,687 (1924)
[hereinafter Chafe'e,I~~terstate].
See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Federal Interpleader
Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 414 (1940) [hereinafter Chafee, 1934;
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Interpleader in the United States Courts (pt. 2), 42 YALEL.J.
41,41(1932)[hereinafter Chafee, United States Courts (pt. 2)]; Chafee, United States
Courts ( p t . I),supra note 1,at 1136.
5. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1994).
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attempt to influence state litigation. As a rule, federal courts
may not enjoin state court proceedings, nor may they circumvent
that rule by enjoining state court litigants i n ~ t e a d . ~This
the date of the original Antiprinciple has existed since 1793,~
Injunction Act.' Any attempt by federal interpleader courts to
affect litigation in state courts must first confront this longstanding prohibition and the delicate power issues that underlie
it.
Interpleader in the federal courts comes in two varieties,
known colloquially as statutory interpleader and rule interpleader. Statutory interpleader came into existence in 1917;' rule
interpleader is a creature of Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Rule 22" or the "Rule") and made its appearance in
1938." Congress explicitly permitted injunctions when enacting
statutory interpleader; for that reason, injunctions in statutory
interpleader cases--even those against state actions-present no
Anti-Injunction Act problem." But Rule 22 has no corresponding
provision.12 Thus, an action under the Rule must either fit within
6. "It is settled that the prohibition of $ 2283 cannot be evaded by addressing the
order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state
proceeding." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
U.S. 281,287 (1970), citing Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309
U.S. 4, 9 (1940) ('That the injunction was a restraint of the parties and was not
formally directed against the state court itself is immaterial."); see also Hill v. Martin,
296 U.S. 393 (1935).
7. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, $ 5, 1 Stat. 334 (current version a t 28 U.S.C.
$ 2283 (1994)).
8. Congress has reenacted the statute several times. The only major change in
its provisions came in the 1948 reenactment, when Congress overruled Toucey v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941). Toucey interpreted the Act far more narrowly
than before, perhaps reflecting frustration with how the courts had been treating it.
"[Bly the 1930's, so many exceptions had been recognized to the Act that some
commentators remarked that 'except for the prohibition, in some cases, of injunction
before judgment, the statute has long been dead."' ERWINCHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL
JURISDICTION
$ 11.2.1, a t 643 (2d ed. 1994) (citation omitted). Congress evidently
intended the 1948 reenactment to recreate the status quo ante, id. at 644, but
subsequent Supreme Court interpretation of the amended Act has given it some
teeth. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
9. Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (current version codified a t 28
U.S.C. $$ 1335, 1397,2361 (1994)).
10. FED.R. CN. P. 22 (1938) (current version at FED.R. CIV. P. 22).
11. Injunctions "authorized by act of Congress" are an exception to the AntiInjunction Act's bar. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1994). See irzfra notes 69, 75-76 and
accompanying text.
12. It is a t least arguable that it would be unavailing to attempt to justify
injunctions against state litigation with a mere rule of civil procedure. See i~zfratext
accompanying note 78.
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one of the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act that does not
depend on congressional action or forgo the advantages of an
injunction against collateral proceedings.13 Few courts have
discussed this problem explicitly, but some have asserted that
such injunctions are permissible "in aid of' the federal court's
jurisdiction.14 That is easy to assert, but it ignores the fact that
the Supreme Court has made clear that the in-aid-of-jurisdiction
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is not available for in
personam actions.16
The easy answer to that dficulty, of course, is to regard
interpleader as an in rem action. But that easy answer runs into
the considerable difficulty that the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have made clear that interpleader is an in personam action.16 And so, the conflict is revealed. The effectiveness
of interpleader depends upon the availability of injunctions
against other proceedings. There is no congressional authorization of such injunctions for rule interpleader cases. If interpleader were an in rern action, one of the other exceptions to the
Anti-Injunction Act might save the day, but the Supreme Court
has apparently foreclosed that option.
This article examines that three-sided conflict. Part I1
discusses the problem in greater depth, focusing first on how

13. This may raise the question of why one would opt to proceed under the Rule
rather than under the Federal Interpleader Act. The answer lies in the differing
requirements of the two interpleaders. There are circumstances in which a case
cannot satisfy the requirements of statutory interpleader but can satisfy those of rule
interpleader. For example, if the stakeholder is a resident of one state and all of the
claimants reside in another state, the minimal diversity required by 28 U.S.C. $ 1335
is unattainable, though the complete diversity required by 28 U.S.C. $1332 (1994)
is present. Other things being equal, a litigant would probably prefer to proceed
under statutory interpleader because its service-of-process provisions are more
lenient (nationwide service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994) versus the customary
geographical restrictions of FED.R. CIV. P. 4), the venue provisions are easier to
satisfy (compare 28 U.S.C. $ 1397 (1994) (statutory interpleader) with 28 U.S.C.
$ 1391 (1994) (rule interpleader)), the amount-in-controversy requirement is less
($500 for statutory interpleader, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1335 (1994),versus in excess
of $50,000 for rule interpleader, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (1994)), and the
diversity requirement can often be easier to satisfy (any diversity among the
claimants satisfies statutory interpleader's requirements pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
$ 1335 (1994), whereas rule interpleader requires complete diversity pursuant to 28
U.S.C. $ 1332 (1994)). But other things are not always equal.
14. See, e.g., Pan Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La.
1960), discussed iufra at notes 116-21and accompanying text.
15. See ii~fra
notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
part 1I.D.
16. See ii~fra
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interpleader functions and why it depends on being "the only
game in town." Part I1 next addresses the background and
interpretation of the Anti-InjunctionAct, exploring particularly
the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation the Act's provisions
and discussing the federalism values that the Act and the Court
seek to serve. Finally, Part I1 reviews interpleader's status as an
in personam action.
Even in setting out the problem, one can conceive of at least
three potential solutions. One might simply acknowledge that
injunctions are not available in rule interpleader actions.
Alternatively, one might reverse the Supreme Court's view of
interpleader as an in personam action, recharacterizing it as in
rem to get around the strictures of the Anti-Injunction Act.
i in all^, one might leave interpleader itself untouched but
reinterpret the jurisdiction exception to the Anti-InjunctionAct.
Unfortunately, each of these solutions comes with an unpalatable
price. Part I11 discusses the price of each solution.
Part IV considers whether, despite the costs of each solution,
Congress or the Court should adopt any of them or whether there
is some other alternative. In fact, there are two alternatives.
Recharacterizing interpleader as an in rem proceeding to fit it
within the Anti-Injunction Act is possible, though not the best
answer because it would require extended judicial effort to refine
the courts' jurisdictional treatment of in rem proceedings
generally. This approach is anything but simple and easy to
implement. The more elegant option is for Congress explicitly to
authorize injunctions against state proceedings in rule interpleader actions, and Part IV offers language that does so.
11.

FEDERAL
INTERPLEADER AND INJUNCTIONS:GENESIS
OF AN
UNEASY
MARRIAGE
A. How Interpleader Works

In modern times, interpleader arises most often in the
context of insurance cases.17 If an insured dies, and there is some

17. The original interpleader act authorized only "insurance companies and
fraternal beneficiary societies to file bills of interpleader."Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch.
113,39 Stat. 929 (current version at 28 U.S.C. $5 1335,1397,2361(1994)). Professor
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., noted of the 1917 Act: 'The Act endeavors to secure interstate
interpleader for the class of stakeholders who need it most, insurance companies."
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difficulty knowing who the intended beneficiaries of the policy
are, the insurer confronts a problem. Suppose, for example, that
the insured originally designated one beneficiary (A) but subsequently may have designated another (B), the paperwork having
become lost. If A sues the company seeking payment, the
company may defend on the ground that B is entitled to the
proceeds. If the company loses, it will pay the proceeds to A. B
may then sue the company to collect the proceeds. The company
may defend on the ground that the evidence shows that A was
entitled to the proceeds, but it may not use issue preclusion to
establish that conclusion because B was not a party to the first
action; due process prohibits burdening B with the results of the
first action.'' A trial in the second action may therefore result in
a verdict for B, in which case the insurance company would be
forced to pay twice.lg Interpleader seeks to avoid this sort of bind
by permitting the insurance company (the stakeholder) to join all
competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of
having to pay more than one time on a single liability.20

Chafee, Interstate, supra note 4, a t 723. In 1940, commenting on the 1936 expansion
of the Federal 1nterpleader Act to permit interpleader actions "by any person, firm,
corporation, association, or society," Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096,
Professor Chafee observed:
It was hoped that the new law would be helpful to railroads, warehouses,
banks (especially savings banks) and oil companies, which are all likely
to be vexed by conflicting claims made by citizens of different states. So
far, however, nearly all the suits under the present statute have been
brought by life insurance companies, and very little advantage has been
taken of it by new kinds of businesses.
Chafee, 1936, supra note 4, at 381. That hope remains largely unrealized. 'Today,
the standard case of interpleader is the insurance company confronted by rival
claimants to the proceeds of a life insurance policy." Hazard & Moskovitz, supra note
3, a t 706-07 (footnote omitted).
18. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) ("A11 agree that '[ilt is a
principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in persoltarn in a litigation in which he is not designated as a
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process."') (quoting
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of
Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)).
19. This was the result in one of the most famous interpleader cases, New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). See irtfra notes 87-94 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Dunlevy.
20. A stakeholder may assert interpleader offensively or defensively. When the
stakeholder takes the initiative and brings the first proceeding, seeking to join all of
the claimants as defendant parties, that is offensive interpleader. On the other hand,
if one of the claimants sues the stakeholder for the stake, the defendant stakeholder
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The conventional view is that common law required a n action
to satisfy a four-part test to be eligible for interpleader: (1)all of
the claimants had to be claiming precisely'the same property or
obligation; (2) all claims had either to be dependent upon each
other or to derive from a common source; (3) the stakeholder
could claim no interest in the stake; and (4) the stakeholder could
have no independent obligation to any claimant.21 The initial
requirement seems a t first blush to be obvious; there is no
inherent reason for a party potentially indebted to numerous
individuals on different claims to be able to compel them to
submit to a joint adjudication of their diverse claims on the

may then seek to join the other claimants. This is defensive interpleader. Rule 22
explicitly contemplates defensive interpleader, noting that "[a] defendant . . . may
obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim," and incorporating
the additional party joinder provisions of Rule 20 by reference. FED.R. CIV.P. 22.
The statute does not seem to permit defensive interpleader, discussing only actions
"filed by any person. . .having in his. . . custody or possession [a stake]." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1335 (1994).The 1936 statute specifically provided for defensive interpleader. Act
of Jan. 20,1936,ch. 13,49Stat. 1096. The current statute, 28 U.S.C. $ 1335,speaks
only of a stakeholder filing an interpleader action, but statutory interpleader actions
proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. CIV. P. 22(B), and
therefore may take advantage of the joinder provisions of Rules 13 and 20. Ilsen &
Sardell, supra note 3, a t 57-58.For convenience, this article will discuss interpleader
a s if it were always offensive.
21. 4 JOHN
N.POMEROY,
EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE
1322 at 906 (3d ed. 1905)
[hereinafter POMEROY].
Pomeroy's four requirements, though so often reiterated by
courts and accepted without comment, may have a questionable ancestry. After an
extensive review of each requirement and the cases discussing it, Hazard and
Moskovitz report:
1. The "classic" requirements for interpleader are not in any proper sense
classic but in fact are of fairly late origin in the history of equitable
jurisdiction.
2. The four requirements for interpleader stated by Pomeroy originated
a s improvisations ad hoc and achieved generalization and authority by
virtue of credulous extensions of precedent.
3. Of the four requirements, one-the requirement that the claimants'
titles be "derivativen or from a "common source"-is plainly insupportable;
another-the requirement that the stakeholder not dispute the extent of
his liability-is the subject of divided authority concealed by the
suppositious '%ill in the nature of interpleader"; another-that the
stakeholder have no "independent liability" to either claimant-was a
response to a now obsolete procedural diffculty; and the remaining
one-that the claims relate to the "same debt or duty"-is question
begging.
. . . [A] fresh start is in order.
Hazard & Moskovitz, supra note 3,at 749-50.That may be, but the courts have made
none. Rule and statutory interpleader, however, abandon in varying degrees some
of the common-law rules. See iltfra notes 24-32and accompanying text. Whether or
not Pomeroy's four requirements actually existed in historical times, seen from
today's perspective with modern interpretations they may a s well have.
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debtor's property. On the other hand, there are many circumstances in which claimants may make conflicting demands for
different amounts from a common fund, and Pomeroy criticizes
what he sees a s a n overly strict reading of this criterion to
exclude such cases from the remedy.22 The second criterion's
rationale is not clear. Pomeroy explains and criticizes it without
documenting its origins or purpose.23 Both requirements have
disappeared from rule and statutory i n t e ~ l e a d e r . ~ ~
The third criterion did not apply to interpleader in its earliest
years.26 The requirement of a disinterested stakeholder-the
strict bill of interpleader-arose in the late 1700s, when the
equity courts began developing settled rules for i n t e r ~ l e a d e r . ~ ~
Thus, by 1840 there were "two kinds of interpleader where one
grew before."27 So, although in the mid-nineteenth century
Pomeroy described interpleader a s requiring the stakeholder to
deposit the stake with the court and to retire from the action,
leaving the claimants to present their arguments without the
presumably indifferent takeh holder,^' this description gives too

22. POMEROY,
supra note 21, § 1323, at 2638-39 n.1.
23. SpecXically, Pomeroy has stated:
W t is a manifest imperfection of the equity jurisdiction that it should be
so limited. A person may be, and is, exposed to danger, vexation, and loss
from conflicting il~deperidelitclaims to the same thing, as well a s from
claims which are dependent; and there is certainly nothing in the nature
of the remedy which need prevent it from being extended to both classes
of demands. It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have sometimes
ignored this doctrine in their decisions, or have been ready to admit
exceptions to its operation.
Id.. $ 1324, a t 2640 n.1.
A. WRIGHT
El' AL.,FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (CML 2d)
24. 7 CHARLES
$ 1701, a t 489 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter FEDERAL
PRACTICE].
25. Ralph V. Rogers, Historical Origiits of litterpleader, 51 YALEL.J.924,932
(1942).
26. Hazard & Moskowitz, supm note 3, a t 708.
27. Id. a t 748. Professor Rogers notes that the terminology "in the nature of
interpleader" may have existed in equity as early a s 1310 in cases similar to
interpleader. Ralph V. Rogers, supra note 25, a t 949.
28. Pomeroy described the process a s follows:
The object of the suit is, that the conflicting claimants shall litigate the
matter among themselves, without involving the stakeholder in their
controversy, with which he has no interest. It is plain, therefore, that the
plaintscan obtain no specific relief. So far a s he is concerned, upon his
filing the bill, and surrendering up the thing or money into the custody of
the court, his remedy is exhausted by the decree that the defendants do
interplead with each other, and that he be freed from or indemnified
against their demands, and that he recover his costs; with the result of
their dispute he has no concern.
POMEROY,
supra note 21,s 1320, a t 2635-36.
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much weight to the comparatively late advent of strict interpleader. Today, both rule and statutory interpleader specifically
proclaim the irrelevance of this ~riterion.~'
The .fourth criterion may have existed to keep out of interpleader's realm cases in which the stakeholder had some incentive to favor a ~laimant,~'
although the interpleader device
contemplated that the stakeholder would deposit the stake with
the court and retire from the action.31 The status of this criterion
in federal interpleader today is not as clear, although commentators note its decline.32

29. "It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the . . . [stakeholder]
plaintiff avers that the plaintiff is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the
claimants." FED.R. CIV.P. 22. 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person
. . . ." 28 U.S.C. $1335 (1994).
30. For example, Pomeroy described the purpose of the fourth criterion as
follows:
In the first place, the agent, depositary, bailee, or other party
demanding an interpleader, in his dealings with one of the claimants, may
have expressly acknowledged the latter's title, or may have bound himself
by contract, so as to render himself liable upon such independent
undertaking, without reference to his possibility to the rival claimant
upon the general nature of the entire transaction. Under these
circumstances, as the plaintiff is liable at all events to one of the
defendants, whatever may be their own respective claims upon the
subject-matter as between themselves, he cannot call upon these
defendants to interplead. He does not stand indifferent between the
claimants, since one of them has a valid legal demand against him a t all
events. . . . In the second class of cases, the independent liability of the
plaintiff to one of the defendants arises from the very nature of the
original relation subsisting between them, without any reference to any
collateral acknowledgment of title, or promise to be bound. The most
important examples of such relations are those subsisting between a
bailee and hiwbailor, an agent or attorney and his principal, a tenant and
his landlord, and the like. In pursuance of the doctrine above stated, if a
bailee is sued by his bailor, or an agent by his principal, or a tenant by his
landlord, and a t the same time a third person asserts a claim of title
adverse and paramount to that of the bailor, principal, or landlord, a suit
of interpleader cannot, in general, be maintained against the two
conflicting claimants, since, from the very nature of the relation, there is
a n independent personal liability, with respect to the subject-matter, of
the bailee to his bailor, of the agent to his principal, and of the tenant to
his landlord.
POMEROY,
supra note 21, § 1327, at 2643-44 (footnote omitted).
31. See supra note 28. See also Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397,400 (6th Cir.
1980).
32. Richard D. Freer, Rethi~tkiiy Compulsory Joirtder: A Proposal to
Restructure Federal Rule 19,60 N.Y.U.L. REV.1061,1109 n.243 (1985) ("mhe trend
in the cases is that the fourth traditional requirement is no longer a restriction under
either rule or statutory interpleader.") See also FEDERALPRACTICE,
supra note 24,
$ 1706, a t 518-22.
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It requires little imagination to see why injunctions are
indispensable to i n t e r ~ l e a d e r . ~Suppose
~
a case where the
disputed property is unique-an auction house holding a valuable
painting to which there are conflicting claims. Such a case could
arise if the winning bid had been submitted by an agent and if
there were multiple possible principals asserting the agency. The
house might certainly want to have a single proceeding determine
which claimant is entitled to the painting, and it might bring an
interpleader action for that purpose. If the action were in federal
court, its mere pendency would not prevent any claimant from
proceeding separately against the auction house in state court.
If the state court then enters a judgment requiring delivery of the
painting to the state plaintiff, of what remaining use is the
federal action?
One may be tempted to solve the unique-property problem by
requiring the stakeholder to deposit the stake with the court.
Unfortunately, although that might be an effective solution for
the interpleader device when the stake is unique, it does not solve
the problem when the stake is cash or fungible goods. Certainly
the court can require the stakeholder to deposit the stake with
the court, but that does not prevent individual claimants from
bringing independent actions and satisfying judgments from the
stakeholder's other assets. Unless the disputed stake is the only
asset the stakeholder possesses, a deposit requirement will not
ensure the utility of interpleader in the general case. As a
practical matter for the stakeholder, it is injunctive protection or
nothing.34

33. See Pan Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D.La.
1960).
Usually interpleader will not be really effective unless all claimants are
brought before the same court in one proceeding and restricted to that
single forum in the assertion of their claims. To accomplish that end,
absent voluntary self-restraint on the part of all interested parties, it is
of course essential that the interpleader court enjoin the institution or
prosecution of other suits on the same subject matter elsewhere.
Id. a t 483.
34. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is
damages or nothing.").
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B. The Two Faces of Federal Interpleader
Modern federal interpleader comes in two varieties that arose
at different times: statutory interpleader and rule interpleader.
Congress created statutory interpleader in 1917 in reactio'n to
New York Life Insurance Co. v. D ~ n l e v y .Before
~ ~ the federal
interpleader act, interpleader in the federal courts was sometimes
available through state interpleader procedure^.^^ Rule interpleader, of course, came in with the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1 9 3 8 . ~ ~

.

35. 241 U.S. 518 (1916). Chafee, Irzterstate, supra note 4, at 722-23; Chafee,
United States Courts (pt. I), supra note 1, a t 1136 ('The Durzlevy decision led the life
insurance companies to obtain the first federal interpleader statute in the following
year, 1917, in order to bring claimants who are citizens of different states into the
United States courts."). Accord Ilsen & Sardell, supra note 3, a t 9, 11.
36. Durzlevy itself involved state interpleader. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.
v. Germaise, 519 F. Supp. 682, 687 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also, e.g., Huxley v.
Pennsylvania Warehousing & Safe Deposit Co., 184 F. 705 (3d Cir. 1911);
Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 253 F. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1918); Kingdom of
Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Until 1938, there were
no federal procedural rules. From 1789 until 1872, the Process Act of 1789, ch. 21,
2 , l Stat. 93 (a temporary statute made permanent by Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36,
$ 2 , 1 Stat. 275), required each federal court to use the procedural law of the state in
which it sat as that law had been on September 29,1789, the date of adoption of the
Act. In 1872, Congress passed the Conformity Act, ch. 255;s 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197
(1872), repealed by Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651,§§ 1-2,48Stat. 1064 (1934) (current
version a t 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994)), which commanded the federal courts to use
contemporaneous state procedures.
Professor Chafee, though noting the existence of these cases, also notes:
However, other decisions take a sounder view in refusing to extend the
interpleader procedure allowed by these state statutes to actions at law
in the United States courts. The Conformity Act does not apply to state
statutes injecting equitable issues into actions at law, for equitable
proceedings are governed by another federal statute, which declares that
"the forms and modes of proceeding in suits of equity . . . shall be
according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of
equity" unless it is otherwise provided by Acts of Congress or by Federal
Equity Rules duly made by the Supreme Court. The federal courts have
insisted that their barrier between law and equity must not be
undermined by state legislation.
Chafee, Urzited States Courts (pt. 2), supra note 4, at 46-47 (footnotes omitted).
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 22. One of the interesting questions about federal
interpleader is why, given the existence of statutory interpleader, the Federal Rules
provided a different form of interpleader at all. It may have been to take advantage
of a diversity pattern different from that authorized by the statute (i.e., one where all
of the claimants were from the same state and the stakeholder was diverse from
them). Chafee points out that the Rule explicitly discarded the disinterestedstakeholder rule, though the statute had not. Chafee, 1936,supra note 4, at 380. The
proceedings of the advisory committee give only a hint of the reason for rule
interpleader:
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1.. The Characteristics of Statutory Interpleader

The federal interpleader act now permits both true interpleader and bills in the nature of interpleader. The statute
requires only that the claimants seek possession of the same
property with a value of at least $500, that any two of the
claimants be of diverse citi~enship,~'
and that the stakeholder
deposit the stake with the court or post a bond in an amount fixed
by the court.39 There is no requirement that the claimants seek
precisely the same property4' or that their claims have a common
origin.41Thus, the statute dispenses entirely with the second and
third common-law requirements, modifies the first, and fails
entirely to mention the
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the statute is the
provision for nationwide service of process43with the concomitant
establishment of,personal jurisdiction by such service.44 While
Rule 22 deals with Interpleader. and it continues the existing statutory
or insurance interpleader, a statute recently passed which authorizes the
service of process in all federal districts.
. . . In fact, this [rule] is interpleader with the shackles of the requirements such as privity, no interest in the stake, and so on, taken away, and
made freely available either as a claim or a counterclaim or otherwise.
There is really no necessity for having a separate rule on interpleader
here, in view of the broad provisions of Rule 20 on general joinder, for that
includes all that is authorized by the interpleader rule.
FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INSTITUTE AT
WASHINGTON,
D.C., OCT.6,7,8,1938,AND OFTHE SYMPOSIUMAT NEWYORKCITY,OCT.
17,18,19,1938 66 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 1939).
38. The statute does not require "complete diversity," as does 28 U.S.C. 5 1332
(1994). Instead, minimal diversity among the claimants is sufficient. In State Farm
Ins. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court upheld this part of the statute,
confirming that the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806), is not a constitutional requirement.
39. 28 U.S.C. 8 1335(a) (1994).
40. Id. 8 133503) (dispensing with the common-law requirement of "identical"
claims). Such a situation might arise, for example, if multiple claimants seek the
proceeds of an insurance policy but not every claimant seeks the entire amount. See,
e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Enright, 231 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
41. 28 U.S.C. 5 133503).
,
42. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
43. 28 U.S.C. 3 2361 (1994).
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under
section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all
claimants. . . . Such process . . . shall be addressed to and served by the
United States marshals for the respective districts where the claimants
reside or may be found.

Id.
44. See Stitzel-Weller Distillery, Inc. v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (W.D.
Ky.
1941).
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this might seem unremarkable today, consider that the Federal
Interpleader Act arrived in 1917, when the only bases for
personal jurisdiction were those described in Pennoyer v. Neffed6
Thus, Congress must have proceeded upon a presence-plusservice theory of jurisdi~tion.~~
The Lingering question is whether
the Due Process Clause permits Congress to do that.47 Congress
also prescribed wide-ranging venue for statutory interpleader
actions, complementing the broad jurisdiction and service
provision: venue is proper wherever one of the claimants

Except where specifically authorized by a Federal statute, the civil process
of a Federal District Court does not run outside the district and service
outside the district is void. . . . Th[e] [interpleader] statute does provide
that the Court in which the interpleader suit is filed shall have power to
issue its process against all claimants . . . which process . . . shall be
addressed to and served by the United States marshal1 [sic] "for the
respective districts wherein said claimants reside or may be found." This
statute confers jurisdiction over all the defendants served, even those
residing in Ohio and Florida.
Id. a t 187-88. Service under the interpleader statute does establish personal
jurisdiction, but the courts have limited its scope to the interpleader dispute itself,
refusing to permit other claims to rely on the same jurisdictional predicate. See iufra
note 91. 'There is considerable case law and literature dealing with the inequity of
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a nonresident claimant by means of nationwide
service of process, thence to subject the claimant to personal liability by cross claim
which could exceed the amount of the interpled res itself." National Coop. Refinery
Assoc. v. Rouse, 60 B.R. 857, 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
45. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
46. One is tempted to see the jurisdiction as based on residence or domicile, but
the statute permits service upon the claimants wherever they may be found in the
United States without requiring that a claimant live in the United States. Thus,
although at least one claimant must be a citizen of a state to bring the case within the
diversity requirements of 28 U.S.C. 8 1332 (1994) (made applicable explicitly by 28
U.S.C. § 1335 (1994)), other claimants may be from other countries.
47. Although beyond the scope of this article, the implications of Congress's
action in this respect are fascinating. Note that interpleader almost invariably seeks
to adjudicate a state-created claim-ssentially a property-rights claim. If Congress
can decree nationwide jurisdiction for those state claims, could it do so for all statecreated claims heard in the federal courts? There seems little basis on which to
distinguish between interpleader claims and other claims presented to the federal
courts in diversity cases. Of course, if nationwide jurisdiction became available for
diversity cases generally, that would give plaintiffs an enormous advantage from
proceeding in federal court, far beyond the desire to avoid "local prejudice" that
seemingly underlies diversity jurisdiction. See JACK
H. FRIEDENTHAL
ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE
23-24 (2d ed. 1993). But see CHARLES
A. WRIGHT,LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS142 (5th ed. 1994) ("The traditional explanation of the diversity jurisdiction
is a fear that state courts would be prejudiced against those litigants from out of
state. . . . This explanation for the grant of diversity jurisdiction has been disputed.").
It is ironic that Congress should have created (and maintained) such an incentive to
forum shop when Erie R. Co. v. Toinpki~u,304 U.S. 64 (1938), placed such emphasis
on avoiding it.
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resides.48 These provisions also explain the great importance of
federal statutory interpleader. Although all of the states have
i n t e ~ l e a d e r , it
~ 'is a device of limited utility when the claimants
are scattered through many jurisdictions, because there may be
no state in which all claimants are amenable to personal jurisdict i ~ n . ~Thus,
'
the advent of the federal statute with its nationwide
service and jurisdictional assumption was a major benefit for
stakeholders.
The statute also explicitly authorizes the federal courts to
enjoin claimants from otherwise litigating with respect to the
stake.61 The injunction that Professor Chafee described as
essential62is thus freely available. Interestingly, and perhaps as
a bow to federalism, the statute describes the injunction as
running against the litigants, not against state courts.63
2.. The Characteristics of Rule Interpleader

Like statutory interpleader, rule interpleader dispenses with
many of the requirements of common-law interpleader.
It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims of
the several claimants or the titles on which their claims
depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but
are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the
plaintiff [stakeholder] avers that the plaintiff is not liable in
whole or in part to any or all of the claimants.64

48. 28 U.S.C. $ 1397 (1994).
49. See, e.g., h.R. CIV. P. 22;ARIZ.R. CIV. P. 22;CAL. C I V PROC.CODE§ 386
(West Supp. 1995);DEL. CT. C. P. R. 22;DEL. CT. CH. R. 22;KY. R. CIV. P. 22;MASS.
R. CIV.P. 22;N.Y.C.P.L.R. 5 1006 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1995);TEX.R. CIV.P. 22;
VT. R. CIV. P. 22.
50. See Chafee, United States Courts @t. I),supra note 1,a t 1134-35("[llf there
are two claimants living in different states, neither of whom can be personally served
in the state where the other resides, it is unlikely that the state courts in either state
will be able to give adequate relief to the stakeholder.") (citing Chafee, Zizterstate,
supra note 4).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994) ("[A] district court may . . . enter its order
restraining them [all claimants] from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any
State or United States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved
in the interpleader action until further order of the court.").
52. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
53. The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that for purposes of the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994),the difference is immaterial. See supra
note 6.
54. FED.R.CIV.P. 22.
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Thus, rule interpleader expressly disposes of the first three
common-law requirement^.^'
The traditional rules that apply to diversity jurisdiction
govern rule i n t e r ~ l e a d e r . ~The
~ opposing parties must be
completely diverse, satisfying the rule of Strawbridge v. C u r t i ~ s . ~ ~
The amount in controversy must exceed $50,000.'~ Rule 4
governs service of process,6gand the traditional venue requirements apply.60 Personal jurisdiction, not being covered explicitly
in the Rule, is governed by the jurisdictional statutes of the states
in which the federal courts sit.61

55. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
56. The predominance of insurance cases, see supra note 17 and accompanying
text, suggests that interpleader based upon federal question jurisdiction will be rare.
In General Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1991), the court found
such jurisdiction because of the federal identity of one claimant. In UIU Severance
Pay Trust Fund v. Local Union No. 18-U, United Steelworkers of America, 998 F.2d
509 (7th Cir. 1993), the court upheld jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) where
a trustee under the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),
29 U.S.C. $8 1001-1461 (1994), brought an interpleader action against rival
claimants. One asserted entitlement to the fund under ERISA, while the other's
claim sounded in common-law restitution. Finally, one court upheld federal question
jurisdiction interpleader in a circumstance in which one of the defendant-claimants
(a United States agency) asserted a claim under the Federal Medical Care Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. $3 2651-2653 (1994), on the theory that although the stakeholder's
interpleader action itself was not federal, the court could consider what the
defendants' coercive claims would have been had they filed them individually,
analogizing the situation to that presented in declaratory judgment cases.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The
dearth of reported cases involving interpleader and federal question jurisdiction
implies that although such cases can arise, they will be a small proportion of all
federal interpleader actions.
57. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
58. 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (1994).
59. FED.R. CIV.P. 4.
60.. 28 U.S.C. $ 1391 (1994).
61. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694 (1982).
m h e federal district courts possess no warrant to create jurisdictional law
of their own. Under the Rules of Decision Act. . .they must apply state
law "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide. . . ." Thus, in the absence of a
federal rule or statute establishing a federal basis for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of the district courts is
determined in diversity cases by the law of the forum State.
Id. at 711 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (citing iuter alia Lakeside Bridge
& Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. dei~ied,
445 U.S. 907 (1980); Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Co., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.
1978); Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. dei~ied,434 U.S. 939
(1977); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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No difference between rule and statutory interpleader is
more important than the fact that the Rule contains no authorization for injunctions to prevent competing litigation for the stake.
Other things being equal, that lack would make rule interpleader
a true poor relation of statutory interpleader; stakeholders having
the choice would certainly elect the latter.62 The lower federal
courts, implicitly recognizing the inutility of rule interpleader
without injunctions, have issued injunctions regularly,63solving
the potential problem of the Anti-Injunction Act by declaring such
injunctions necessary in aid of the court's jurisdi~tion.~~
That
declaration requires a closer look a t the Anti-Injunction Act and
the second exception to its otherwise blanket prohibition of
federal court injunctions of state court proceedings.

C. A Primer on the Anti-Injunction Act
It is not possible to identify an immediate stimulus for the
Anti-Injunction Act." Its early appearance and remarkable
persistence emphasize the extreme sensitivity of federal-state
relations. When the Act appeared in 1793, state suspicion of the
then-new federal government was as great as it has ever been.
This was the period of the Bill of Rights, the bitter fight over the
establishment of a national bank, and the Whiskey Rebellion, all
of which concerned the powers of the federal g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~
62. Given the different requirements of rule and statutory interpleader,
stakeholders may not have the choice. If a stakeholder, for example, shares
citizenship with any claimant, the case cannot qualify for rule interpleader because
the complete diversity requirement is not satisfied. On the other hand, if all of the
claimants reside in one state, the case cannot qualify for statutory interpleader but
may do so for rule interpleader, provided only that the amount in controversy is
sufficient.
63. In Lowther v. New York Life Ins. Co., 278 F. 405 (3d Cir. 1922), a statutory
interpleader case, the court refused, on Anti-Injunction Act grounds, to enjoin state
proceedings. Lowther caused Congress to amend the statute i11 1926 (Act of May 8,
1926, ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416) specifically to permit such injunctiolis. Chafee, United
States Courts (pt. I), supra note 1, a t 1164 n.lOO. That judicial reticence, however,
has not manifested itself in rule interpleader cases. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v.
Balbin, 591 F.2d 1040, 1042 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979), mentions the potential AntiInjunction Act problem without speculating upon a solution. There are no reported
cases explicitly denying injunctive relief in a rule interpleader action on the basis of
the Anti-Injunction Act.
64. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
65. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 8, at 642 ("Because there is no legislative history
for the statute, it is unknown why Congress chose to enact this restriction.").
66. ALLANNEVINS& HENRYSTEELECOMMAGER,
A SHORTHISTORYOF THE
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Moreover, in the same year a s the Anti-Injunction Act, the
Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia,67which sparked the
Eleventh Amendment.68
While the lower federal courts were given certain powers in the
1789 Act, they were not given any power to review directly
cases from state courts, and they have not been given such
powers since that time. Only the Supreme Court was authorized to review on direct appeal the decisions of state courts.
Thus from the beginning we have had in this country two
essentially separate legal systems. Each system proceeds
independently of the other with ultimate review in this Court
of the federal questions raised in either system. Understandably this dual court system was bound to lead to conflicts and
frictions. Litigants who foresaw the possibility of more
favorable treatment in one or the other system would predictably hasten to invoke the powers of whichever court it was
believed would present the best chance of success. Obviously
this dual system could not function if state and federal courts
were free to fight each other for control of a particular case.
Thus, in order to make the dual system work and "to prevent
needless friction between state and federal courts," it was
necessary to work out lines of demarcation between the two
systems. Some of these limits were spelled out in the 1789 Act.
Others have been added by later statutes as well as judicial
decisions. The 1793 anti-injunction Act was a t least in part a
response to these pressure^.^'

UNITEDSTATES136-49 (5th ed. 1966).
67. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
68. U.S. CONST.amend. XI. "'The decision in that case, that a State was liable
to suit by a citizen of another State or of a foreign country, literally shocked the
Nation. Sentiment for passage of a constitutional amendment to override the
decision rapidly gained momentum, and five years after Chisholin the Eleventh
Amendment was officially announced by President John Adams." Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974).
69. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
286 (1970) (footnote and citations omitted). The Court cited the inconclusive, though
extended, discussion of the Act's history in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.
118, 130-31 (1941) (footnote and citations omitted):
The history of this provision in the Judiciary Act of 1793 is not fully
known. We know that on December 31,1790, Attorney General Edmund
Randolph reported to the House of Representatives on desirable changes
in the Judiciary Act of 1789. . . .A section of the proposed bill submitted
by him provided that "no injunction in equity shall be granted by a district
court to a judgment at law of a State court." Randolph explained that this
clause "will debar the district court from interfering with the judgments
a t law in the State courts; for if the plaintiff and defendant rely upon the
State courts, a s far as the judgment, they ought to continue there as they
have begun. It is enough to split the same suit into one at law, and
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Whatever the' specific stimuli, the thrust of the Act was and is
clear: the federal judiciary has quite limited power to enjoin state
court proceedings. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act
has solidified that message.,
By its terms the Act permits the federal judiciary to enjoin
state proceedings in only three circumstances. "A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in
a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgment^."^' It is noteworthy that the Act seeks
directly to protect the states not from the federal government as
a whole but from the federal judiciary. This appears to reflect
two things: first, the underlying suspicion of the federal judiciary
as a countermajoritarian (and certainly counterstate) institution
and second, the then-prevailing view that the political branches
of the federal government were more amenable to state influence
because of the states' role in declaring the qualifications of the
ele~torate,~'
electing senators, 72andproviding the electors who

another in equity, without adding a further separation, by throwing the
common law side of the question into the State courts, and the equity side
into the federal courts." . . .
Charles Warren . . . suggests that this provision was the direct
consequence of Randolph's report. This seems doubtful, in view of the
very narrow purpose of Randolph's proposal, namely, that federal courts
of equity should not interfere with the enforcement of judgments a t law
rendered in the state courts.
There is no record of any debates over the statute. It has been
suggested that the provision reflected the then strong feeling against the
unwarranted intrusion of federal courts upon state sovereignty. Chisholrn
u. Georgia was decided on February 18,1793,less than two weeks before
the provision was enacted into law. The significance of this proximity is
doubtful. Much more probable is the suggestion that the provision
reflected the prevailing prejudices against equity jurisdiction.
70. 28 U.S.C. Ej 2283 (1994). For brevity's sake, this article will refer to the three
areas of permissible federal injunctions a s the congressional exception, the
jurisdiction exception, and the judgment exception.
71. U.S. CONST.art. I, Ej 2,cl. 1: "[Tlhe electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature." The Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments now limit the
states' ability completely to control voter qualifications for federal election purposes.
U.S. CONST.amends. XXIV, XXVI.
72. U.S. CONST.art. I, Ej 3,cl. 1: 'The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof. . . ."
The Seventeenth Amendment, U.S. CONST.amend. XVII, superseded this selection
method, providing for direct election of senators and reiterating the voter
qualification rule then applicable for the House of Representatives, but now subject
to further constitutional limitation. See supra note 71.
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actually selected the president.73 The Madisonian Compromise
in the Constitutional Convention concerning the structure of the
federal judiciary74reflected the battle between Federalists and
Anti-Federalists over whether to have a full set of trial and
appellate courts or whether that would at best duplicate the state
courts' efforts and at worst invite unwanted exercise of unreviewable federal power.75 Consistent with that history, the Supreme
Court has, for the most part, interpreted the exceptions to the Act
narrowly.
The congressional exception seems to brook little interpretation. One's first impression is that it should be easy to determine
whether Congress has expressly authorized injunctions against
state proceedings, and most of the time it is. The statutory
interpleader authorization is a good example; it leaves no doubt
about the courts' injunctive
On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has interpreted at least one statute to be such an
authorization despite the absence of a clear statement.77 For
purposes of this article, however, the congressional exception
offers no hope for rule interpleader, because there is no statute
upon which to lean.78
73. U.S. CONST.art. 11, 3 1, cl. 2:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress:
but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
supra note 66,a t 135-36. Article I11 reflects the
74. NEVINS& COMMAGER,
Convention's deferring to Congress for resolution of the issue. U.S. CONST.art. 111,
5 1: 'The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme.Court,
and.in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."
75. WRIGHT,supra note 47,a t 2;CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 8, at 2-4.
76. See supra note 51. See also 11 U.S.C. 5 105(a) (1994);Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C. 3 1166(d) (1994).
77. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972),held that the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1994),is such an exception. The statute itself merely
discusses the general availability of equitable relief, without any mention of such
relief running against state courts or state litigation. "In what may be one of the
most bizarre contortions of Supreme Court analysis, the Court in Mitchurn found
section 1983 to be an 'implied' express exception (an oxymoron if ever there was one)
. . . ." Martin H. Redish, Absteittioit, Separatioit of Powers, aitd the Liinits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALEL.J.71,87 (1984).
78. See 28 U.S.C. 3 2074 (1994). It is important to note the distinction between
congressional action in passing a statute and congressional behavior in permitting
a proposed new rule of civil procedure to become effective. To become law, a bill must
pass both houses of Congress and then either receive the President's signature (or
grudging acquiescence implied in withholding the signature without vetoing the
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the jurisdiction exception
to the Act very restrictively. The leading case is Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive engineer^,^' in
which the parties, in state and federal cases, were litigating the
union's entitlement to picket free from state interference. The
Railroad unsuccessfully sought a federal injunction against union
picketing, but later obtained one from a state court. After an
intervening decision of the Supreme Court in a related case
upheld the union's right to picket an adjacent facility, the union
petitioned the state court to dissolve its injunction. The state
court refused, and the union, rather than appealing through the
state system, secured from the federal court an injunction
restraining enforcement of the state injunction.'' The issue for
the Supreme Court was whether the federal injunction was
justified under either the jurisdiction or judgment exceptions of
the Anti-Injunction Act. The Court lost no time limiting the scope
of both.
[I]f the District Court does have jurisdiction, it is not enough
that the requested injunction is related to that jurisdiction, but
it must be "necessary in aid of' that jurisdiction. While this
language is admittedly broad, we conclude that it implies
something similar to the concept of injunctions to "protect or
effectuate" judgments. Both exceptions to the general prohibimeasure) or have two-thirds support in each house of Congress if the President vetoes
it. A proposed rule of civil procedure, however, need merely fail to move Congress to
act in order to become law. If Congress fails affirmatively to override a proposed rule
between the May 1 submission date and December 1 effective date prescribed by
5 2074,the rule is law. It is difficult to equate congressional failure to act to block a
proposed rule with the "express[] authoriz[ation] by act of Congress" that the AntiInjunction Act contemplates. Indeed, the Anti-Injunction Act's great concern with the
federalism issues inherently raised whenever a federal court enjoins a state court
strongly suggests that Congress intended not to permit such injunctions unless the
federal legislative process had run its full course. Congressional failure to override
a proposed rule is hardly that.
79. 398 U.S.281 (1970).
80. Justice Black's majority opinion attempted to identify the theory underlying
the union's return to federal court in apparent defiance of the Act:
[Tlhe argument is somewhat unclear, but it appears to go in this way:
The District Court had acquired jurisdiction over the labor controversy in
1967 when the railroad filed its complaint, and it determined a t that time
that it did have jurisdiction. The dispute involved the legality of picketing
by the union and the Jacksol~villeTermi~laldecision clearly indicated that
such activity was not only legal, but was protected from state court
interference. The state court had interfered with that right, and thus a
federal injunction was "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction."
Id. a t 294.

Heinonline - - 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 570 1996

19961

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?

571

tion of [section] 2283 imply that some federal injunctive relief
may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering
with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as
to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority
to decide that case. . . . [Vhe state and federal courts had
concurrent jurisdiction in this case, and neither court was free
to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims
in both courts. Therefore the state court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the state law claims and the federaipreclusion issue did not hinder the federal court's iurisdiction so as
to make an injunction necessary to aid that jurisdi~tion.~'
As a practical matter, the Court has upheld injunctions based on
the jurisdiction exception only in two circumstances: (1)removal
jurisdiction, under which a federal court may enjoin further
proceedings i n the state court from which the action came,82a n d
(2) cases in which the federal court's jurisdiction depended on
attachment of property: jurisdiction that is either in rem or quasi
in r e n a 3

81. Id. a t 295-96 (citations omitted).
82. The Anti-Injunction Act "has always been deemed inapplicable to removal
proceedings. The true rationale of these decisions is that the Removal Acts qualify
pro tanto the Act of 1793." Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118,133 (1941)
(citations omitted). One might also argue that such injunctions are a t least a s
"expressly authorized" a s those issued under 42 U.S.C. $1983 (1994). See supra note
77 and accompanying text. After all, the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 8 1446(d) (1994).
explicitly provides that after the defendant or defendants file the removal petition,
the "State court. . . shall effect the removal and . . . shall proceed no further unless
and until the case is remanded."
83. Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U.S. 47 (1943), provides the best single
statement by the Supreme Court of this rule, though the Court decided the case
before the 1948 amendment of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Act then read: "the writ
of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay
proceedings in any court of a State." Act of Mar. 3,1911, ch. 231, $265,36 Stat. 1162.
The Court observed:
To this sweeping command there is a long recognized exception that if two
suits pending, one in a state and the other in a federal court, are in rern
or quasi ira rein, so that the court or its officer must have possession or
control of the property which is the subject matter of the suits in order to
proceed with the cause and to grant the relief sought, the court first
acquiring jurisdiction or assuming control of such property is entitled to
maintain and exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
In such cases this Court has uniformly held that a federal court may
protect its jurisdiction thus acquired by restraining the parties from
prosecuting a like suit in a state court notwithstanding the prohibition of
$ 265. This exception to the prohibition has been regarded a s one of
necessity to prevent unseemly conflicts between the federal and state
courts and to prevent the impasse which would arise if the federal court
were unable to maintain its possession and control of the property, which
are indispensable to the exercise of the jurisdiction it has assumed. But
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The Supreme Court has also restricted the scope of the
judgment exception, as the quotation above suggests. As a
general rule, the Court has allowed injunctions based on this
exception to implement the principles of claim and issue preclusion, reflecting the exception's purpose of overruling Tou~ey.'~
The judgment exception might be relevant to interpleader cases
in the federal courts after they have gone to judgment. Once the
federal court has adjudicated the rights of the conflicting claimants and decreed the disposition of the stake, it would be appropriate for the court to ensure the effectiveness of its judgment by
preventing losing claimants from evading the federal result by
beginning a state action." It is noteworthy, however, that the
Court has interpreted the judgment exception so that it is
superfluous unless a state court ignores the normal rules of
p r e c l u s i ~ n In
. ~ ~addition, the judgment exception does nothing to
protect the stakeholder when a state case brought by a claimant
concludes before the federal interpleader case.
Against this backdrop, it is tempting to classlfy interpleader
cases as in rem or quasi in rem so that the jurisdiction exception
applies. But that door, as the next subsection shows, may be a
trap door.

where the judgment sought is strictly in persoiurin for the recovery of
money or for an injunction compelling or restraining action by the
defendant, both a state court and a federal court having concurrent
jurisdiction may proceed with the litigation a t least until judgment is
obtained in one court, which may be set up as res judicata in the other.
Mandeville, 318 U.S. at 48-49.Since Congress intended the 1948 amendment to the
statute merely to reestablish the law a s it had existed prior to Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941),see supra note 8,the change in the statute makes
no difference to the principle the Court expressed.
84. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941). See supra note 8 and
supra note 47,at 304-05.
accompanying text. See gei~erallyWRIGHT,
PRACTICE,
supra note 24,s 1717,a t 616.
85. FEDERAL
86. Given the background of the Anti-Injunction Act and the continuing theme
of federal-state friction in American history, perhaps this is not so odd. Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), arose because of the Virginia
Supreme Court's refusal to acknowledge the United States Supreme Court's position
in the hierarchy, and a s recently as nine years ago the Attorney General of the
United States expressed the view that the Court's rulings were not "the supreme law
of the land." Stdart Taylor, Meese Says Ruliitgs by U.S. High Court Don't Establish
Law, N.Y. TIMES,Oct. 23,1986,a t 1.
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D. I n Personam Interpleader
Ironically, the case that spawned federal statutory interpleader is also the case whose declaration threatens the efficacy
of rule interpleader. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dun1evys7 is
both a textbook example of the necessity of the interpleader
device and a n unwitting partner of the Anti-Injunction Act in
making rule interpleader less useful. Close examination of the
facts demonstrates why.
Effie Dunlevy's father, Joseph Gould, purchased a life
insurance policy from New York Life. I n 1893, after Gould took
out the policy, he may have assigned it to his daughter; the
dispute in the case ultimately revolved, inconclusively, around
that event. In a n action entirely unconnected with the poliiy,
Boggs & Buhl recovered a judgment against Dunlevy in 1907.
Two years later, when the policy became payable, she had moved
to California. Boggs & Buhl attempted to execute the judgment
against the proceeds of the policy. New York Life and Gould
appeared, the latter denying that a n assignment had occurred
and demanding payment in full. At that point, New York Life
obtained a n order of the Pennsylvania court permitting it to
interplead Gould and Dunlevy. The court directed notice to
Dunlevy in California, but she did not appear. The court awarded
Gould the proceeds, and New York Life paid him the full amount.
Of Boggs & Buhl no more is heard.
I n 1910, Dunlevy began a California action against Gould
and New York Life, establishing jurisdiction by serving both with
process in California. New York Life defended the California
action on res judicata grounds, but the lower federal courts (to
which Dunlevy's state action had been removed) ruled in her
favor." The Supreme Court affirmed, with the result that New
York Life had to pay twice, once to Gould a s a result of the
Pennsylvania proceeding and once to Dunlevy a s a result of the
California proceeding. Explaining why the Pennsylvania
87. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
88. Then as now, the predecessor of today's Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C.
$ 1738 (1994),required federal courts to give full faith and credit to state court
judgments. See Act of Mar. 27,1804,ch. 56,2Stat. 298-99.But also then as now, a
defect in personal jurisdiction took the relied-upon judgment out of the statute,
permitting the second forum to ignore the void judgment. See generally EUGENE
F.
SCOLES
& PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 968-73 (2d ed. 1992); RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICTOF LAWS94 (1986).
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proceeding was ineffective to adjudicate Dunlevy's rights to the
policy proceeds, the Court rejected New York Life's argument that
the Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction over Dunlevy a s a part of
the Boggs & Buhl action.
[ y h e interpleader initiated by the company was a n altogether
different matter. This was a n attempt to bring about a final
and conclusive adjudication of her personal rights, not merely
to discover property and apply it to debts. And unless in
contemplation of law she was before the court and required to
respond to that issue, its orders and judgments in respect
thereto were not binding on her.

....
. . . The interpleader proceedings were not essential con-

comitants of the original action by Boggs & Buhl against
Dunlevy but plainly collateral and when summoned to respond
in that action she was not required to anticipate them.

....

The established general rule is that any personal judgment which a state court may render against one who did not
voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction, and who is not a citizen
of the state, nor served with process within its borders, no
matter what the mode of service, is void, because the court had
no jurisdiction over his person.89

Accordingly, the Court concluded "that the proceedings in the
Pennsylvania court constituted no bar to the action in
Calif~rnia."~'
Note that had the Pennsylvania interpleader action been
viewed a s in rem, even though the Court regarded it a s separate
from the Boggs & Buhl suit," jurisdiction over Dunlevy would not
89. 241 U.S. at 521-23 (citations omitted) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5
Otto) 714 (1877)).
90. Id. a t 523.
91. The Court seems to have viewed it as a separate proceeding for due process
and notice purposes. Its theory is clearly that the original process that Dunlevy
received in the Boggs & Buhl action cannot have put her on notice that property
rights unrelated to that dispute were subject to the court's adjudication. See supra
text accompanying note 89. Thus, even though New York Life apparently
interpleaded as a part of the garnishment proceeding, the Court ruled that
jurisdiction to adjudicate Dunlevy's entitlement to the insurance proceeds had to be
established separately. New York Life relied upon Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228
U.S. 346 (1913), in which the Court, reviewing a proceeding involving an estate, had
said that "if a judicial proceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the person of the
party concerned, it is within the power of a state to bind him by every subsequent
order in the cause." Id. at 353. But, discussing Ferry, the Dunlevy Court observed:
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have been a problem, and the resulting judgment would have
been entitled to full faith and credit in the California action.92
But the Court's language leaves no doubt that nothing less than
in personam jurishction in the interpleader proceeding would do.
Courts since that time have followed this view of interpleader,93
although some have noted that the law is confused as to the
proper characterization.
[Tlhe question is unsettled. While there is broad language
implying that interpleader is an action in personam in New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, . . . the effect of the holding
has been diminished by later Supreme Court decisions taking
a due process approach to jurisdiction and service of process
and blurring the distinctions between actions in personam and
actions in rem. This unclarity is noticeable in the lower courts'
decisions where interpleader has been held to [be] an action in

The judgment under consideration was fairly within the reasonable
anticipation of the executor when he submitted himself to the probate
court. But a wholly different and intolerable condition would result from
acceptance of the theory that, after final judgment, a defendant remains
in court and subject to whatsoever orders may be entered under title of
the cause.
241 U.S. a t 522. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Enright, 231 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.
Cal. 1964) (interpleader court lacked jurisdiction to direct one claimant to pay
disputed amount to another claimant where stakeholder had made preliminary
distribution to first claimant); Stitzel-Weller Distillery, Inc. v. Norman, 30 F. Supp.
182,188 (W.D. Ky. 1941):
[The interpleader statute] does not confer jurisdiction over defendants in
another state against whom a personal judgment is sought by a cross-bill
filed by a codefendant. Such a proceeding is not an interpleader
proceeding, and in such a proceeding the cross-defendants are not
"claimants" a s provided by the statute, but they are defendants in an
action in personam.
supra note 88, a t 225-31, 963, 968-70.
92. See geilerally SCOLES& HAY,
93. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 362 (11th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Major Oil Corp., 583 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1978);
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Copeland, 398 F.2d 364, 367 (4th Cir. 1968); Kitzer v.
Phalen Park State Bank, 379 F.2d 650,654 (8th Cir. 1967);Knoll v. Socony Mobil Oil
Co., 369 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1966); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 289 F.
Supp. 261,263 (D.S.C. 1968); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dumpson, 194 F. Supp. 9,
11 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Coumantaros, 146 F. Supp. 51, 53 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Du Roure, 123 F. Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Commentators seem to agree with the courts. See, e.g., Janet C. Alexander,
Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARv. L. REV.387,
445 n.231 (1992); Stanley E. Cox, Jurisdictiort, Venue and Aggregation of Contacts:
The Real Mi~tirnurnCorttacts artd Federalisrn Questions Raised by 01nni Capital,
Inter~tationulv. Redolf Wolff & Co., 42 ARK. L. REV.211, 318 n.236 (1989); Steven M.
Larimore, Exploriizg the Interface Betweert Rule 23 Class Actioru aitd the AntiIitjurtctw~zAct, 18GA.L. REV.259,286-88 (1984); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actwiu
and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND.L.J. 507, 532 (1987).
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personam, an action in rem, and an action in personam only as
to the disposition of the funds deposited into court.94
While most of this quotation may be agreeable, it misses the point
with respect to the Anti-Injunction Act. For purposes of due
process and personal jurisdiction, it may make little difference in
the post-Shaffer era how one characterizes i n t e ~ l e a d e r . 'On
~ the
other hand, the Supreme Court has never retreated from the in
personam characterization itself, and this view of interpleader is
very important with respect to whether the device quaMes under
the Anti-Injunction Act's jurisdiction exception.
Thus, the three pieces of the picture are in place. Injunctions
are necessary for effective interpleader. The Anti-Injunction Act's
general prohibition of injunctions against state proceedings
appears to preclude rule interpleader injunctions unless they are
"necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction." The Supreme Court
has limited that exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to in rern or
quasi in rern cases, but also has declared interpleader actions to
be in personam. Unfortunately, a s the next section demonstrates,
changing any part of this three-cornered dilemma creates
additional problems.

There are a t least three conceivable solutions to rule interpleader's impossible picture that do not involve congressional
action. First, one might simply declare injunctions unavailable
in rule interpleader cases. Second, one might recharacterize
interpleader a s a proceeding in rern or quasi in rem. Third, one
might reconceptualize the jurisdiction exception of the Anti-

94. First Tenn. Nat'l Bank, Chattanooga v. FDIC, 421 F. Supp. 35, 37-38 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976) (citations omitted). Accord Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741
F.2d a t 363 ("Courts are not in complete agreement over the nature of an interpleader
action. Some have indicated that interpleader is an irt rern or quasi in rern
proceeding, while others have characterized interpleader as ir~persoruzrn.")(citations
omitted). See also United States v. Major Oil Corp., 583 F.2d a t 1158; Knoll v. Socony
Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d a t 429; Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 289 F. Supp. a t
263 (all note that the interpleader court's jurisdiction extends only to the stake); Cf.
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704, 715 (10th Cir. 1971); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Riverview Gas Compression Co., 409 F. Supp. 486, 491 (N.D. Tex.
1976) (both take the position that the interpleader court cannot entertain unrelated
in persorturn claims against any claimant).
96. See infra notes 103-11.
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Injunction Act, broadening it to include in personam cases. Each
of these approaches, however, arguably creates more problems
than it solves.
A. Rule Interpleader Without Injunctions
As courts and commentators have recognized, interpleader is
ineffective without injunctions that limit claimants to one forum
for a binding adj~dication,'~
so the practical effect of declaring
injunctions unavailable in rule interpleader cases would be to
render rule interpleader substantially useless. Stakeholders
having a choice would certainly opt for statutory interpleader.
Stakeholders may, of course, favor statutory interpleader in any
case when a choice exists simply because of its more generous
service-of-process, jurisdiction, and venue provision^.^' The
competitive edge that statutory interpleader enjoys under those
provisions, however, would be comparatively insignificant if
statutory interpleader also offered the only possibility of preventing claimants from pursuing individual claims against the
stakeholder. Without injunctions to support it, rule interpleader
would certainly qualify for the endangered species list.

B. Interpleader as an I n Rem Action
I n some ways, characterizing interpleader a s a n in rem action
is the most attractive of the three alternatives, because it seems
not to carry the institutional price of the other two. It would not,
a s a practical matter, destroy rule interpleader, nor would it have
the broader implications for federal-state relations that reinterpreting the Anti-Injunction Act would have.98 .Although the
institutional price of this solution is not high, it carries a potential personal cost to claimants.
The forum for a n action in rem is determined by the location
of the pr~perty.~'When the disputed property is real estate, that
result is logical and, indeed, unavoidable because the courts of

96. See supra notes 4, 34 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 43,48,58-60and accompanying text. There apparently are
no statistics kept on the distribution of interpleader cases between those brought
under the Rule and those brought under the statute.
98. See infra part 1II.C-D.
99. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,supra note 47, at 83-84.
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one jurisdiction cannot directly affect title to real property
situated elsewhere.loOIf the dispute involves personal property,
however, a s interpleader so often does,lO' that logic disappears.
I n its wake comes the danger that claimants may be forced to
travel to distant and inconvenient jurisdictions to protect their
rights. That difficulty is exacerbated because the claimants have
no power over where the stakeholder takes the property. Indeed,
a stakeholder who is also a claimant might remove the property
to a forum known to be inconvenient for many of the claimants,
thereby enhancing the possibility of retaining the stake. I n a
related context, the Supreme Court cautioned that chattel should
not function a s a defendant's agent for service of process and
concomitant establishment of jurisdiction.lo2Shaffer v. Heitner'03
underlies that pronouncement. There the Court considered
whether property within a state is sufficient, without more, to
subject its owner to the power of the forum's courts. Shaffer
requires further examination, because of both its similarities to
and differences from typical interpleader cases.
Heitner, owner of a single share of stock in Greyhound
Corporation, brought a shareholder's derivative action against the
company's officers and directors on the theory that they had
exposed Greyhound to antitrust liability and a criminal contempt
sanction. Greyhound was a Delaware corporation.lo4 Heitner

100. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963) ("[Tlhe courts of one State are
completely without jurisdiction directly to affect title to land in other States.") (citing
Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1910); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1(1909); Carpenter
v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891)). The Fall Court did point out that a state may
indirectly affect title to out-of-state land if it has in personarn jurisdiction over the
owner by ordering the owner to convey the land. The state may not, however, when
faced with the owner's refusal to do so, appoint its own officer to act in the owner's
stead. 215 U.S. a t 6-12. The Fall method is of no use in interpleader, however,
because the claimants over whom the court requires jurisdiction do not, by definition,
have title to the property in dispute; the stakeholderholds the title.
101. Recall that the original federal interpleader statute made the device
available only for insurance.companiesand fraternal benefit associations. See supra
note 17. Even the 1936 expansion of the Act added categories of stakeholders much
more likely to hold personal than real property. See id.
102. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,296 (1980). There
the plaintiff attempted to use the chattel's presence as a predicate for in persoltarn,
not in rein, jurisdiction. But after Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), there is no
difference in standards. See irtfra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
103. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
104. After Shaffer and Delaware's legislative response to it, subjecting officers
and directors of all Delaware corporations to Delaware jurisdiction, DEL.CODEANN.
tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1994), Greyhound's officers and directors sought shareholder
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invoked the Delaware courts' quasi in rem jurisdiction by
obtaining sequestration of approximately 28,000 shares of the
officers' and directors' stock in the corporation. At the time,
Delaware had a statute making Delaware the situs of all stock in
Delaware corporations, irrespective of the actual location of the
stock certificate^.'^^ The Delaware courts upheld jurisdiction; the
defendants appealed.
The Supreme Court seized the opportunity to attempt to
unify the law of personal jurisdiction. From Pennoyer v. Neffo6
until Shaffer, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction were considered separately from in personam jurisdiction for due process
purposes. International Shoe Co. v. Washingtonlo7 and the
Supreme Court cases that followed it (even those since Shaffer)
discussed only in personam j u r i s & c t i ~ n . ' In
~ ~Shaffer, the Court
approval to reincorporate in Arizona, at least in part to save officers and directors the
jurisdictional inconvenience of Delaware. David L. Ratner & Donald E. Schwartz,
The Irnpact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substarttive Law of Corporatior~s,45 BROOK.
L. REV. 641, 653-54 (1979). They got their wish. JOHN
J. COUNDET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE:
CASESAND A ATE RIALS 164 (6th ed. 1993).
105. DEL.CODEANN.
tit. 8 , s 169 (1991). This statute alters the customary rule
that "[i]f the intangible interest is represented by a document in which the interest
itself is merged, as in the case of the ordinary negotiable promissory note or bond,
claims with regard to it may be adjudicated in the state where the document is
located." SCOLES& HAY,supra note 88, a t 230 (footnote omitted).
The true purpose of the sequestration, as Delaware candidly admitted, was only
incidentally to encumber the stock.
The primary purpose of "sequestration" as authorized by [the
Delaware statute] is not to secure possession of property pending a trial
between resident debtors and creditors on the issue of who has the right
to retain it. On the contrary, as here employed, "sequestration" is a
process used to compel the personal appearance of a nonresident
defendant to answer and defend a suit brought against him in a court of
equity. . . . If the defendant enters a general appearance, the sequestered
property is routinely released. . . .
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 193 (citation omitted) (quoting the unreported opinion
of the Delaware Court of Chancery from which Shaffer sought review). The Supreme
Court later noted the full effect of Delaware's system: "[Tlhe express purpose of the
Delaware sequestration procedure is to compel the defendant to enter a personal
appearance." Id. at 209. The footnote which follows this sentence reads as follows:
'This purpose is emphasized by Delaware's refusal to allow any defense on the merits
unless the defendant enters a general appearance, thus submitting to full irt
persorLarn liability." Id. n.33. Thus, Delaware sought to hold defendants' property
hostage to ensure the defendants' appearance.
106. 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877).
107. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
108. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); McGee v.
Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Haneon v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
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consolidated its treatment of the three types .of personal jurisdiction.
Well-reasoned lower court opinions have questioned the
proposition that the presence of property in a State gives that
State jurisdiction to adjudicate rights to the property regardless of the relationship of the underlying dispute and the
property owner to the forum. The overwhelming majority of
commentators have [sic] also rejected Pennoyer's premise that
a proceeding "against" property is not a proceeding against the
owners of that property. Accordingly, they urge that the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" that
govern a State's power to adjudicate in personam should also
govern its power to adjudicate personal rights to property
located in the State.

....
. . . We . . . conclude that

all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set
forth in International Shoe and its progeny.lo9

Thus, simply saying that a n action is in rem or quasi in rem no
longer solves a n otherwise-existing jurisdictional problem.
Shaffer noted, however, that many assertions of jurisdiction
based upon property would be legitimate even under the minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe. Property within the
state is a form of contact between the person over whom the court
seeks jurisdiction and the state. The Court noted that when
"claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying
controversy," jurisdiction will ordinarily exist.l1° That language
seems perfect to describe interpleader. Claims to the property are

(1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604
(1990). The sole exception is Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), in which the
Court repudiated a quasi irt rein jurisdictional assertion that did not comply with
Shaffer.
109. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 205, 212. The final sentence of the
quotation has been the subject of some dispute among the Justices, though not in a
way that affects whether interpleader should be regarded a s an irt rern action. In
Burrzhain, Justices Scalia and Brennan clashed over whether Shaffer's assertion of
the general application of btterrtotiortol Shoe's minimum contacts standard included
all defendants (Brennan, J., concuning in the judgment) or only defendants not found
within the state (Scalia, J., plurality). They agreed, however, that service of process
upon Burnham while he was in the forum established in persoltarn jurisdiction. See
495 U.S. 604.
110. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207-08 (footnote omitted).
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the controversy. Nonetheless, the Court noted that jurisdiction
is not automatic in disputed property cases."'
This precisely highlights one problem of regarding interpleader as a n in rem action. Because the subject property is so
often movable-and
not a t the claimants' instance-simply
declaring a n interest in property as sufficient for jurisdiction
effectively makes the property the disfavored "agent for service of
process" that the Supreme Court condemned.l12 The stakeholder
could wield enormous power to affect the outcome of the dispute
by removing the property to a forum chosen either for its substantive law or its choice-of-law rules.ll3
This possibility of stakeholder control might appear
diminished in cases appropriate for defensive interpleader (where
a claimant commences litigation against the stakeholder, who
then seeks defensively to interplead the remaining claimants).
Two possibilities undermine that conclusion. First, if the
claimant-versus-stakeholder action is in a state court, the
remaining claimants may not be amenable to jurisdiction.
Second, the stakeholder may not wish to litigate in the original
forum and so may commence its own federal litigation, either in
the forum or in some other state. Although this would create
parallel litigation involving the same dispute, it is far from clear

111. The materials the Court cites suggest cases such as where the property
arrives in the jurisdiction by fraud, for use in judicial proceedings, or without the
consent of the owner. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS5 60,
cmts. c, d (1969); Note, The Power of a State to Affect Title in a Chattel Atypically
Rernoved to It, 47 COLUM.L. REV.767 (1947). Certainly a claimant could contest
jurisdiction based on the stake's presence, arguing that she did not consent and that
it is anomalous simultaneously to predicate jurisdiction upon ownership of property
and to deny her the benefit of the consent rule.
112. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
113. A stakeholder might wish to affect the outcome either if it were denying
liability wholly or in part (i.e., if the stakeholder were also a claimant) or if the
stakeholder, for whatever reason, favored one of the claimants.
Although this article concerns only federal interpleader, state law is also highly
relevant. Because the underlying claims to the property are almost always founded
on state law, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, the doctrine of Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), generally requires application of state
substantive law. The federal courts must apply state conflicts law as well. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Thus, a stakeholder may be able
to bring the interpleader either in a state that would apply its own (favorable)
substantive law or in a state whose conflicts principles require application of the
(favorable) substantive law of another state.
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that the later-commenced federal action would defer to the state
action brought by a single claimant.l14
Thus, regarding interpleader proceedings as in rem cases
creates some significant problems. All may not be lost, however;
it may be possible to recharacterize interpleader and yet to cabin
the in rem jurisdiction that recharacterization would spawn.l16
Before examining that possibility, however, it is necessary to
consider whether rule interpleader proceedings as presently
characterized should quallfv for injunctions under the jurisdiction
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
C. In Personam Interpleader and the Jurisdiction
Except ion

The courts that have discussed injunctions and rule interpleader have concluded that rule interpleader cases quallfv under
the jurisdiction exception. In Pan American Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Revere,ll6 Judge Skelly Wright noted:
The question whether the court entertaining a non-statutory
interpleader suit may enjoin state court proceedings on the
same issues on the theory that it is "necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction" is not free from doubt. Before Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., such power appears to have been recognized. Not
surprisingly, afterward, it was denied. But with the 1948
Revision overruling Toucey and expressly codifying the
exception, the old rule may be deemed reestablished, and every

114. Federal courts often defer to pending state litigation, a s is most vividly
seen in the doctrines of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),and Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). There are even
occasions when federal courts defer to state litigation commenced after the federal
proceeding. See, e.g., Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137 (1995);Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Arguably, the hypothesized case .of parallel state
property and federal interpleader actions presents none of the predicates for federal
abstention. There is no dominant state interest in federal noninterference with state
processes, a s is the case with Yow~gerabstention. There is no specialized state
expertise or administrative program with which federal litigation would interfere, as
is the case with Colorado River abstention. And one cannot say that the state
proceeding is just as likely to resolve the entire controversy as is the federal
interpleader action, the primary factor upon which Wiltora relied. Given the Court's
great expansion of Yourger abstention over the last quarter century, however, a
federal court should perhaps abstain in favor of a parallel state case. See irtfra part
1II.D.
115. See ir~frapart 1V.A.
116. 188 F.Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
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indication is that, regardless of the Interpleader Act, the power
of a federal court to enjoin pending state court proceedings in

a case like this one will be sustained. Certainly that result is
desirable, if not indispensable."'
Judge Wright observed that before the 1948 recodification of the
Anti-Injunction Act, there was no stated jurisdiction exception to
its prohibition, "but the jurisprudence had nevertheless made
such a n ex~eption.""~The "reestablishment" of the old rule to
which Pan American refers seems to have been less than thunderous. Judge Wright cites only two cases, one a declaratory
judgment action upholding a stay of state proceedings and the
other where he characterizes the proposition a s dictum, and a
secondary source.11g Since Pan American, only three reported
cases have mentioned the injunction difficulty under Rule 22.
One cites only a secondary source a s authority for the
proposition;120the other two rely largely upon Pan American.121
Some commentators have attempted to bridge the gap,
though some of their efforts seem more to highlight the courts'
sleight of hand than to rationalize it.
Since Atlantic Coast Line, federal courts have consistently
applied the necessary-in-aidexception to enjoin parallel state

117. Id. a t 484-85 (citations and footnotes omitted).
118. Id. at 486 n.50.
119. See id. at 486 n.53.
120. Sotheby's, Inc. v. Garcia, 802 F. Supp. 1058, 1066 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("In
rule interpleader actions, injunctive relief is available, albeit not pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 5 2361, in order to effectuate a district court's exercise of its jurisdiction.")
PRACTICE,
supra note 24, 8 1717, at 615-16).
(citing FEDERAL
121. The more extended discussion appears in General Ry. Signal Co. v.
Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1991) (footnote and citations omitted):
If a plaintiff is otherwise qualified for injunctive relief, the AntiInjunction Act presents no barrier to an injunction sought by General
Railway in a Rule 22(1) interpleader action. . . . A federal court can issue
an injunction directed at state court proceedings . . . if "necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction." The All Writs Act, consistent with the Anti-Injunction
Act, provides that 'The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
A federal court presiding over an interpleader action may stay
pending state court proceedings involving the same interpled fund under
the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act. . Judge Wright's reasoning [in Pail Ainerica~t]has garnered the
support of commentators.
See also Emmco Ins. Co. v. Frankford Trust Co., 352 F. Supp. 130, 133 (E.D. Pa.
1972).

..
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court proceedings-even in personam proceedings-when the
federal actions were brought as rule 22 interpleader cases.
The crucial factor allowing the use of the exception when
personal liability is a t stake seems to be the existence of a n
identifiable property or limited fund. In essence, the presence
of a n identifiable property or limited fund permits reclassification of the case as in rem.122

Others, also without much discussion, simply assert the availability of injunctions under the jurisdiction exception:
[Tlhe mere fact that a nationwide injunction under Section
2361 is not available in a rule interpleader case does not mean
that the court does not have discretion in the latter context to
issue a n order against those claimants that have been subjected to the court's jurisdiction in accordance with the more
traditional rules applicable in cases under Rule 22. Certainly
if the court can assert personal jurisdiction over a claimant it
has the power to issue a n order designed to effectuate that
exercise of jurisdi~ti0n.l~~

But surely this is too broad a n assertion; it implies that a federal
court lacks power to issue injunctions against other proceedings
only when it has no jurisdiction over the defendant. Such a
reading deprives the Anti-Injunction Act of any effect, a problem
not lost on, but also not,solved by, the same commentators:

i

One argument against recognizing the court's discretion to
enjoin overlapping proceedings in rule interpleader cases is
that it might result in a significant incursion on the policies
embodied in the [Anti-Injunction Act] . . . . But t h e . . . statute
permits a federal court to stay proceedings in a state court
"where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments." A preliminary injunction to stay a
state court action while the federal court determines the Rule
22 interpleader case might be regarded as "necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction. . . ." Accordingly, the proper accommodation
between the policy against enjoining state.proceedings and the
objectives of rule interpleader is to recognize the federal court's
power to issue a n order whenever a pending state court action

122. Larimore, supra note 93, at 287-88 (footnotes omitted). Accord Sherman,
supra note 93, at 531 ('The fact that they involve laying before the court the issue of
who has the right to property or a fund allows them to be analogized to in rern
proceedings.").
123. FEDERALPRACTICE,
supra note 24, $ 1717, at 615-16.
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represents a threat to the effectiveness of the interpleader suit
or the enforceability of its judgment.lZ4
This is a superficially attractive approach. Read fast enough, it
appears to make sense. Taken a t face value, however, it proves
too much and overlooks the Supreme Court's teaching about the
jurisdiction exception and the nature of interpleader.
There are several circumstances in which state litigation may
threaten the efficacy of a federal action. For example, suppose the
obligee on a contract brings a diversity action seeking specific
performance. Simultaneously, the obligor commences a state
action seeking rescission. The state action, if successful, may
make the federal action unavailing. If the state case ends first
and results in a judgment for the obligor, that will cut off the
federal case because the state judgment must receive full faith
and credit in the federal court.126Indeed, whenever there is
parallel litigation, the state court can, by finishing first, effectively destroy the federal case. For a case that bears a closer
resemblance to interpleader, suppose two litigants assert a right
to possession of a chattel. The nonpossessor commences a federal
action sounding in replevin. The possessor simultaneously
commences a state action for a declaratory judgment that he is
the rightful possessor. Should the mere possibility of inconsistent
results permit the federal court to enjoin the state action under
the jurisdiction exception? If the possibility of a conflicting state
court result were enough to trigger the jurisdiction exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, there would be little left for the Act to do.
Accordingly, one must conclude that the commentators do not
intend the suggestion that a federal court may issue a n injunction
"whenever a pending state court action represents a threat to the
effectiveness of the interpleader
to be a general prescription for federal injunctions against state proceedings. More
likely, they are viewing interpleader a s unique and urging that
its unique nature requires this extraordinary remedy. As a
matter of policy, one might agree; it probably is a good idea to
permit such injunctions. But Congress has not delegated to the
courts such free-wheeling authority to prescribe federal judicial
policy in the face of the Anti-Injunction Act. Whether such
124. Id. at 616.
125. 28 U.S.C.§ 1738 (1994).
126. Id.
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injunctions are a good idea or not, the Act stands a s a barrier not
so easily overcome. I n fact, by concentrating on the unique
nature of interpleader, the commentators .seem to be trying to
squeeze it in a s a n in rem case through the back door. The
difficulties hypothesized for interpleader suits also exist for in
rem actions. Interpleader is not in rem, however, and the attempt
fails.12'
It is well to remember that although the motives underlying
the original Anti-Injunction Act are not clear, the Supreme Court
has taken the position that it was intended to prevent statefederal court friction.12' Accepting that a s the purpose of the Act,
obviously Congress could not simultaneously have contemplated
that the federal courts should decide for themselves when it
would be a good idea to grant a n injunction against state proceedings. This seems particularly the case with respect to rule
interpleader, which, after all, is based not on a n act of Congress
but instead upon a rule of procedure that originates with the
federal courts themselves, the very institution to be restrained by
the Act.
The Court has implicitly recognized that the jurisdiction
exception will swallow the rule unless carefully cabined. The
difficulty in describing interpleader to bring it within the
jurisdiction exception without simultaneously including other
cases to which the Anti-Injunction Act has long applied strongly
suggests that what might first appear to be only a modest
expansion of the jurisdiction exception is ill-advised. The AntiInjunction Act reflects a delicate balancing of federal and state
interests and power, and reinterpreting a n exception in a way
that would greatly expand (even if unintentionally) the numbers
and kinds of cases in which a federal court may enjoin a state
proceeding would have enormous implications for federalism.
The Court has often cautioned that the federal judiciary should
be particularly cautious about upsetting the federalism balance
by invading state prerogatives and interfering with state func-

127. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
128. CHERMERINSKY,
supra note 8, at 642 (citing Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend
Corp., 433 U.S. 623,630 (1977); Leiter Minerals v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225
(1957)).
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tions.lZ9 An acceptable solution to the problem of rule interpleader and injunctions does not lie here.

D. Rule Interpleader Injunctions as Exceptions to the
Younger Abstention Doctrine
Younger v. Harrisl3' has come to be synonymous with an
abstention doctrine that actually antedates the case by nearly a
century.l3l Briefly stated and somewhat oversimplified, it
declares that federal courts should not interfere with pending
state criminal proceedings unless the federal plaintiff will suffer
great, immediate, and irreparable harm in the absence of federal
intervention and has no adequate remedy a t law.132 Younger
made plain as well that the opportunity to raise a federal
constitutional claim in the state criminal process is a remedy at
law sufficient to preclude federal court i n t e r ~ e n t i 0 n . l ~ ~

129. One manifestation of this came in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314
U.S. 118,(1941),when the Court refused to endorse a federal injunction against a
state proceeding that threatened completely to ignore the res judicata effect of a final
federal judgment. Characterizing the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court noted:
Section 265 is not an isolated instance of withholding from the federal
courts equity powers.possessed by Anglo-American courts. As part of the
delicate adjustments required by our federalism, Congress has rigorously
controlled the "inferior courts" in their relation to the courts of the
states. . . .
The guiding consideration in the enforcement of Congressional policy
was expressed by Mr. Justice Campbell, for the Court . . . : 'The legislation of Congress, in organizing the judicial powers of the United States,
exhibits much circumspection in avoiding occasions for placing the
tribunals of the States and of the Union in any collision."
We must be scrupulous in our regard for the limits within which
Congress has confined the authority of the courts of its own creation.
Id. at 141 (citation omitted). Congress's subsequent repudiation of the specific
holding of Toucey, see supra note 8,does nothing to undermine the Court's cautious
approach generally. The Court's five abstention doctrines, under Railroad Comm'n
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941);Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
Thibodeaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),also demonstrate its deeply felt reluctance to
permit the federal judiciary even to appear to invade an area occupied by state
judicial power.
130. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
131. For an excellent discussion of the history of Younger abstention, see Donald
H. Zeigler, An Accornrnodation of the You~zgerDoctrirre and the Duty of the Federal
Courts to Enforce Corlstitutw~talSafeguards in the State Crirninul Process, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 266 (1976).
132. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46.
133. Id. a t 46.
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I n the years following Younger, the Court extended the
doctrine to include proceedings not themselves criminal in nature
but "in aid of and closely related to" state criminal proceeding^,'^^
state judicial proceedings in which the state was a party,136a
contempt proceeding in a n action involving private parties,136a
purely civil proceeding involving state officials and state child
neglect laws,13' state administrative proceedings,138and a purely
private civil proceeding not involving the state's contempt
power.13' The Court has also permitted a later-commenced state
criminal proceeding to oust a federal court of jurisdiction when
the latter had not yet conducted "proceedings of substance on the
merits."140The doctrine is, in its modern form, one of great scope,
imposing significant restraints on the federal courts' abilities to
entertain litigation involving issues also of interest to the state
courts.
Statutory interpleader does not implicate Younger concerns,
probably because it would be unseemly for the Court to impose a
judge-made abstention doctrine to override a specific legislative
authorization of injunctions against state proceedings.141 But the
injunctions entered in rule interpleader proceedings do seem to
collide with the Younger doctrine. I n cases where a claimant has
filed a state action against the stakeholder only to be precluded
by a later-entered federal injunction in a n interpleader action,

134. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,604(1975).The Court described the
state's nuisance proceeding in Huffinait a s "more akin to a criminal prosecution than
are most civil cases." Id.
135. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
136. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
137. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
138. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619
(1986).
139. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
140. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,349(1975). See also Wilton v. Seven Falls
Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137 (1995),in which the Court ordered abstention where a latercommenced state civil suit between private parties sought to adjudicate the same
issues a s were involved in the earlier-commenced federal declaratory judgment
action. Abstention here, however, was based on Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),rather than on Your~ger. Wilto~t,115 S.
Ct. a t 2140.
141. See 28 U.S.C. 5 2361 (1994). For the Court to do so without creating a
constitutional crisis, it would have to find that Younger abstention expresses a
constitutional imperative, making that part of the interpleader act unconstitutional.
Although one commentator has argued that Younger is constitutionally based, see
Calvin R. Massey, Absterttwrt artd the Cortstitutwlml Lirnits of Judicial Power of the
United States, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811,the courts have not sounded that theme.

Heinonline

--

67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 588 1996

19961

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?

589

Younger seems clearly to be relevant. Even in cases where the
federal rule interpleader action begins before independent state
actions by claimants against the stakeholder, a rapid claimant
response to the federal litigation in the form of an individual
action against the stakeholder appears to present the sequence of
actions found to require federal abstention in Hicks v. mi rand^'^^
and Wilton v. Seven Falls C O . ' ~ ~
It seems a t least arguable, therefore, that when the federal
courts issue injunctions against other actions during the course
of litigating a rule interpleader case, they create a de facto
exception to the scope of Younger abstention. After all, if federal
intervention in an action between two private companies impliis ~
cates Younger, as happened in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, I ~ c . ,it' ~
difficult to see why entering an injunction in a rule interpleader
situation would not. While that; is hardly more offensive than sub
silentio either creating additions to the Anti-Injunction Act14' or
revising the Supreme Court's characterization of interpleader as
an in personam action,146it does add to the Looking Glass quality
of the law surrounding federal interpleader. The present system
works as long as no one stops to ask what is really happening or
to examine the law's consistency and observation of its own
tenets.
There are, however, two approaches that would reconcile the
existing discord. As the next part shows, recharacterizing
interpleader as an in rem action might solve the problem,
provided that jurisdictional principles receive their due rather
than being consigned to analysis by label. That is not the better
solution, however. The cleaner, less troublesome answer should
come from C ~ n g r e s s . ' ~ ~
'

142. 422 U.S. 332.
143. 115 S. Ct. 2137.
144. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
145. 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 (1994). See supra part 1II.C.
146. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
147. An assertion that the easier, better answer lies with Congress deserves to
be met with a certain skepticism. That Congress does hold the key perhaps
demonstrates better than extensive analysis how seriously flawed the present
accommodation of rule interpleader and the Anti-InjunctionAct is.
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SOLUTIONS
THATWILLWORK(BETTER)
A. Recharacterizing Interpleader

It might seem tempting simply to recharacterize interpleader
~ ~ bringing
as a n in rem proceeding, overruling D ~ n l e v y 'and
interpleader within the ambit of the jurisdiction exception. The
"simple" approach, however, would require extended judicial
involvement because of the uncertainties left by Shaffer v.
Heitner.14' Shaffer trod a middle ground with respect to in rem
cases. It did not leave them untouched, a t least by dictum, yet it
furnished no clear rules for how the new regime would apply. We
have only Justice Marshall's cryptic statements that jurisdiction
will normally exist in such cases.l6' This solution, therefore,
would place a n immediate and continuing burden on the courts
to clanfy when property within the forum is a sufficient jurisdictional predicate and, when it is not, to articulate what additional
factors the courts should consider.
That job, however, is not impossible. Indeed, taking seriously
Shaffer's teaching that all jurisdictional assertions must meet the
in personam standards of International Shoe requires recognizing
that the distinction between in personam and in rem is of no
consequence whatever for jurisdictional purposes, having
significance only for the Anti-Injunction Act. However true that
may be, it does not avoid the problem; it merely pastes a different
label on it. The fact is that neither the Supreme Court nor the
inferior federal courts have been notably active since Shaffer in
elaborating the circumstances in which property within the forum
suffices to establish jurisdiction. That is work that the courts
would have to do.'''

148. See supra part 1I.D.
149. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See supra notes 103-110and accompanying text.

150. Id., a t 207-08(footnote omitted). See supra note 110 and accompanying
text.
161. The courta should already be engaged in this process for rule interpleader.
Statutory interpleader avoids the problem because Congress has created nationwide
jurisdiction. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Rule interpleader does
not enjoy such an advantage, so theoretically, a t least, the federal courts are even
now engaged in evaluating this irt persolwin device for jurisdictional purposes,
presumably using the stake--the property-as one of the relevant contacts. The
difficulty here is that there are very few reported cases discussing the jurisdictional
issues.
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The courts must confront the question of how much contact
between claimant and forum is enough to support jurisdiction.
When the stake is movable, the courts should be reluctant to
declare that its mere presence subjects all claimants, irrespective
of their other contacts with the forum, to jurisdiction. After all,
that pattern bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the chattelas-agent variation that the Court disparaged in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. W o o d ~ o n . ' I~t~is not even a s strong a case
for jurisdiction as World-Wide. .At least in World-Wide, the Court
hypothesized that the defendant was able to anticipate that its
product could reach the forum.163.That will often not'be possible
for claimants, most or all of whom have never had control of the
stake.
The failure of simple presence of the stake a s a jurisdictional
predicate thrusts upon the courts the job of analyzing all of the
other contacts with the forum of each claimant. It will be
necessary to consider factors such as whether each claimant
(1)anticipated having a n interest in the stake and knew it would
be in the forum, (2) knew that the stake might travel to the forum
even if the claimant had no long-standing expectation of a n
interest in the stake or knowledge of its whereabouts, and (3) had
any contact with or control over either the stakeholder or the
person or entity that created the claimant's interest in the
stake.lS4 On top of these ethereal considerations, the courts will
also have to consider the now-traditional factors under the
heading of "convenience."1s6 Although this may be the stuff of

152. 444 U.S. 286,296 (1980). See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
153. World-Wide, 444 U.S.a t 287.
154. These factors reflect the focus of modern jurisdictional analysis on forum
contacts, as begun in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). and
continued in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286,
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985),and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Although the Court pointed out in each of those
cases that foreseeability of forum involvement standing alone is insufficient to
establish jurisdiction, it clearly is a relevant factor.
155. In World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286, Justice White's majority opinion noted
several factors as significant to the jurisdictional inquiry, though in his view clearly
subordinate to minimum contacts as guarantors both of defendants' individual liberty
interests and states' sovereignty limitations. Those factors included the degree of
inconvenience to the defendant if required to litigate in the forum, the forum's
interest in the application of its own law to the case, and whether the forum is the
most convenient place for litigation. Id. a t 294. Justice Brennan's dissent took no
issue with the particular factors but argued that the majority's hierarchy accorded
them "too little weight." Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Burger Kiitg, 471
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which first-year Civil Procedure examinations are made, it is
probably not a good recommendation for a predictable, easy-toadminister legal structure.
In addition to the complexities of fitting the newly-characterized in rem case into the analytical structure of jurisdiction, this
proposed solution sidesteps, the real issue. The underlying
problem is not establishing jurisdiction in doubtful cases; it is
justifying issuance of injunctions in rule interpleader cases, even
those in which jurisdiction may present no problem a t
Accordingly, it seems better to attack the Anti-Injunction Act
problem head-on.

B. A Capitol Solution
The cleanest way to rationalize the impossible picture now
presented by injunctions in rule interpleader cases is for Congress
to make rule interpleader an express exception to the general
prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act. Amending Rule 22
probably would not suffice. The Anti-Injunction Act speaks of
something "expressly authorized by Act of Congress," and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although Congress must at least
acquiesce in them, are not themselves congressional acts.16'
Congress could either pass an entirely new statute applying
specifically to rule interpleader or amend the section of the
federal interpleader act that grants injunctive power in statutory
interpleader cases168to include rule interpleader cases. For
example, the amended statute might read:

U.S.462, Justice Brennan achieved a majority and apparently gave the convenience
factors approximately equal weight. Id. at 482-84. Finally, in Asahi, 480 U.S. 102,
eight justices endorsed jurisdictional analysis predicated partially on those factors.
Id. at 112-15. Justice Scalia, the ninth, did not explicitly disagree, but he did not join
Part 11-Bof Justice O'Connor's opinion, possibly because he accepted the hierarchy
implied by Justice White in World-Wide and therefore felt discussion of the
convenience factors to be dictum given Asahi's posture. Id. at 104.
156. It is not hard to hypothesize such a case. In a circumstance in which all of
the claimants reside in one state and the stakeholder (perhaps an insurance company
or the fiduciary of an estate) resides in another, the stakeholder may elect to bring
a rule interpleader proceeding in the federal courts of the claimants' common
domicile. Subject matter jurisdiction would exist pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1332 (1994),
(assuming that the stake was worth more than $60,000), and domicile obviously
suffices to establish personal jurisdiction.
157. See supra note 78.
168. 28 U.S.C. 4 2361 (1994).

Heinonline

- - 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 592 1996

19961

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?

593

In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title, a district court may
issue its process for all claimants and enter its order restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any
State or United States court affecting the property, instrument
or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further
order of the court. A district court may also issue such orders
in civil actions of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader
maintained under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . .
4

This solution eliminates the problem of unauthorized injunctions
in rule interpleader actions without casting the courts adrift on
the seas of a new and unfamiliar jurisdictional inquiry.15' As
proposed, the statute does not change the limitation of rule
interpleader to "traditional" rather than "national" jurisdictional
rules.'60 It merely addresses the problem that nobody talks
about.
It is difficult to hypothesize a policy reason for statutory, but
not rule, interpleader to enjoy an express exemption from the
Anti-Injunction Act, a statute designed to protect the states' place
in the federal structure. There do not seem to be greater federalism stresses from enjoining state proceedings in rule interpleader
cases than in statutory interpleader case^.'^' That there are no
reported cases refusing injunctions in rule interpleader cases on
Anti-Injunction Act grounds connotes that there is no fundamental federalism policy battle going on here. The only thing
happening is that the inferior federal courts are issuing injunctions in rule interpleader actions in apparent (but unspoken)
defiance of Supreme Court declarations about the Anti-Injunction
Act and the nature of interpleader. That combination has the

159. This would also eliminate whatever Younger problems might otherwise
arise from a federal court's refusal to abstain because of a parallel state court
proceeding. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
160. It would be simple enough to amend the statute to provide nationwide
jurisdiction in rule interpleader cases as well, and 1 confess that it is not readily
apparent to me why only one of the interpleader devices should enjoy this advantage.
That, of course, begs the question of whether Congress can accomplish this result
constitutionally. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. .
161. Perhaps Congress should consolidate the two types of interpleader into a
single proceeding with alternative jurisdictional and venue requirements. There
seems to be little reason to segregate rule and statutory interpleader, and it is not
clear why they grew up separately in the fvst place. See supra notes 35-37and
accompanying text.
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water of the 1aw:runninguphill. Like Escher's "Waterfal1,"if one
looks at it quickly enough, the picture is untroubling. If one looks
carefully, the image is impossible and int01erable.l~~

There is, without doubt, the temptation to brush the problem
aside. Rule interpleader has been functioning since 1938 with the
aid of injunctions. Stakeholders and claimants have not complained. The states, which the Anti-Injunction Act theoretically
protects from the incursions of the federal judiciary, have not
complained either. And the de facto principle that injunctions
against state proceedings may issue in in personam actions has
not threatened to spread beyond the bounds of rule interpleader.
What is the harm?
The harm is to the structure of the law. No matter how
complex, the law ought to make sense; it ought to be internally
consistent. When the law "ignores itself," it diminishes respect
for the law. The courts have not always resisted inconsistency.
One of the best known examples occurs in the Eleventh Amendment area. In Ex parte
the Court's analysis of the
Eleventh Amendment and of Hans v. L ~ u i s i a n aled
' ~ ~it to declare
a state attorney general both a private citizen and a state official
when performing the same act. The Court then seized separately
upon attributes of each of those statuses and combined them to
permit the action to go forward. Ex parte Young is one of the
most important constitutional cases of the twentieth century,165

162. See supra pages 551-52.
163. 209 U.S.123 (1908).
164. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
165. Justice Brennan has described Exparte Youltg a s
the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the
Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers
secured elsewhere in the Constitution. During the years between Osborlt
and Youltg, and particularly after the Civil War, Congress undertook to
make the federal courts the primary guardians of constitutional rights. . . .
The principal foundations of the expanded federal jurisdiction in
constitutional cases were the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . . which in 5 1
empowered the federal courts to adjudicate the constitutionality of actions
of any person taken under color of state [law] . . . and the Judiciary Act of
1875 . . . which gave lower federal courts general federal-question
jurisdiction . . . . These two statutes, together, after 1908, with the
decision in Exparte Young, established the modern framework for federal
protection of constitutional rights from state interference.
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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yet commentators have ridiculed the manner in which the Court
reached the r e ~ u 1 t . lIt~benefits
~
neither the Court nor the law to
engage so patently in irrationality.
Hazard and Moskovitz, explaining the underlying need for
inter~leader,'~~
also unintentionally highlighted the dilemma that
confronts the courts in rule interpleader cases today. Interpleader must have injunctions to be an effective remedy. Under
established Anti-InjunctionAct jurisprudence, only in rem actions
justify federal injunctions under the jurisdiction exception.
Interpleader is an in personam action. The courts thus face
conflicting demands of law and practicality similar to those that
confront Hazard and Moskovitz's stakeholder.
This is not only a grave matter, it is a subversion of the very
basis of the legal order. I t is intolerable that a legal system
should come down a t the point of application to tell someone
[perhaps especially a court] that he has orders such that he
cannot help but disobey. It is subversive of the legal order that
this be done, for a social order that is not a police state
requires general voluntary obedience to the rules and this in
turn requires general, and certainly official, assent that the

Justice Brennan also noted that "'the doctrine of Exparte Young seems indispensable
to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law."' Id. a t 110
(quoting CHARLESA. WRIGHT,HANDBOOKOF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS186 (2d ed.
1970)).
166. For example, one scholar claimed:
[In Ex parte Youitg] the Court . . . unveiled one of the most remarkable
sophistries in its history. . . .
If the statute is unconstitutional, the person charged with its
enforcement is shorn of his off~cialinsignia and acts only in hie private
capacity. Therefore, a suit against him is not against the state and does
not affront the eleventh amendment. Contrariwise, under a constitutional
statute the eleventh amendment attaches to the public official and to the
state which he personifies. Constitutionality thus becomes the litmus. If
a statute is unconstitutional, judicial sorcery recasts city policeman as
private eye.
Burton D. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Crirninal Law and the First Ameradmeist,
49 N.Y.U. L. REV.740,763(1974).
167. Hazard and Moskovitz explained the need for interpleader as follows:
The principal point to be recognized is that the middleman [stakeholder]
does not simply confront a dilemma [as to whom to pay first]-the debtor
with two creditors does that-nor does he simply face "double or multiple
liability-the railroad with the train wreck is in that position. Rather
the middleman that interpleader seeks to help is a man facing a dilemma
that is caused by the fact that the law (incipiently if not yet actually) is
addressing him with conflicting commands. . .. [I]f no procedure exists for
reconciling the results [of separate litigation], the middleman is
confronted with two commands one of which he must violate.
Hazard & Moskovitz, supra note 3, at 752.
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rules are to be taken seriously as binding obligations. It is
impossible for them so to be taken if the only sensible response
to official command[s] is to laugh or cry or to fight or lie down.
. . . The legal sovereign can tolerate a lot of sloppiness and
a lot of error in its administration. It can even swallow the
incongruities of reaching contradictory decisions on identical
law and similar facts, as in the train wreck situation [that
produces some verdicts for passenger plaintiffs and some for
the railroad defendant]. But it cannot even for a brief interval
rest officially indifferent to the fact that on a particular
occasion it was talking out of both sides of its mouth, and
uttering a command that it knew it could not enforce.16'

.

Federal courts today confront a situation in which either they
must eviscerate rule interpleader by refusing injunctions or
ignore either the Anti-Injunction Act or the Supreme Court's
characterization of interpleader as an in personam action. They
have been unwilling to do the first and consequently have thrust
themselves into repeatedly doing one of the latter two, but
without admitting it. Such action is, a t the least, unseemly.
The incompatibility that exists in the law of rule interpleader
is not the worst in the law nor the greatest threat to the law's
harmony. But allowing injunctions in in personam cases under
the jurisdiction exception to the Anti-Injunction Act invites
expansion of that exception, eroding the Act's underlying p01icy.l~~
That would have major implications for federalism. There is no
need for the law to cast itself in disrepute or for the courts to
continue, perhaps unwittingly, to pretend that the problem is not
there. "Waterfall" is great art but terrible architecture. Congress
can recognize and solve the problem with rule interpleader, and
it should.

168. Id. at 752-53 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
169. One might see expansion along the lines hypothesized earlier, where an
obligee and an obligor in a contract dispute each begin a separate action, one in state
court and one in federal court, and the federal plaintiff seeks then to enjoin the state
action. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.

Heinonline - - 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 596 1996

